Houthis May Use Satellite Data to Target Saudi Tankers

Renewed Attacks Signal a More Precise Houthi Campaign

According to a report by The Maritime Executive, the Houthis have launched a new wave of attacks against Saudi-associated shipping in the Red Sea, striking the VLCC Layla, the tanker Encelia, and the products tanker NCC Masa within a short span. The NCC Masa suffered only superficial damage and continued its voyage, but the incident is notable because the vessel was operating along the Saudi Red Sea coast rather than transiting toward the Bab el Mandeb — pointing to a targeting strategy aimed broadly at any Saudi-linked ship, not just a chokepoint blockade.

From Indiscriminate Strikes to Precision Targeting

Past Houthi anti-shipping campaigns were often described as scattershot and imprecise. The pattern emerging from these latest strikes suggests something different: a more deliberate selection of targets that fit specific criteria, even when those vessels are far from the coastal areas near Hajjah and Hodeidah where fishing boats and shore-based observers would typically supply intelligence.

This shift raises the possibility that the Houthis now have reliable access to near real-time, high-resolution satellite imagery — potentially facilitated by Iran. Iran has reportedly provided the group with terminal equipment linked to the Russian/Iranian Kanopus-V/Khayyam satellite network, as well as access to China’s Jilin-1 mini-satellite constellation and the TEE-01B imaging satellite built by Beijing-based The Earth Eye Co. Iran is said to have paid $37 million for access to that system in March 2024, and it is believed to be the same capability behind the accuracy of recent strikes on U.S. bases in the Gulf.

Coordinated Strikes and a Widening Conflict

Alongside improved targeting, the Houthis appear to be coordinating multiple weapons systems against single targets simultaneously — so far without a confirmed hit, but a worrying development nonetheless. Senior Houthi figures have also reportedly gone quiet on media channels, a tactic apparently learned from being targeted through public broadcasts during earlier rounds of fighting.

Saudi Arabia’s initial response was measured, hitting a telecommunications site in Hodeidah and coastal radar installations on Kamaran Island while deliberately avoiding ports used for humanitarian food aid. The Houthis escalated regardless, striking storage tanks at the Jizan oil refinery and reportedly hitting Yanbu, with additional heat signatures suggesting a strike near a communications facility close to Abha’s military airfield. Saudi forces have since reportedly conducted air strikes further inland, in Marib and Al Jawf, believed to target missile launch sites.

The Houthi military spokesman has publicly widened the stated scope of the campaign, framing it as a military alliance with Iran and threatening retaliation against any country that strikes either Iran or Houthi-held Yemen. U.S. officials have signaled they may hold Iran’s Revolutionary Guard accountable alongside the Houthis, and at least one U.S. Navy destroyer is currently positioned in the lower Red Sea.

What This Means for Owners and Charterers

For ship owners, managers, and charterers with any Saudi commercial exposure, this development changes the risk calculus. If Houthi forces genuinely have improved satellite-based tracking, the assumption that avoiding the immediate Bab el Mandeb corridor reduces exposure may no longer hold — vessels calling at or trading between Saudi Red Sea ports appear to be squarely within the threat envelope regardless of their route. This raises practical questions for voyage planning, flag and charter-party risk disclosures, and insurance coverage reviews. It also underscores the value of independent condition and pre-departure inspections for vessels transiting or operating in contested waters, where documenting hull and cargo status before and after a voyage can be critical for claims handling if a vessel is struck or diverted. Owners should also revisit AIS transmission practices and communications discipline, given that the same intelligence-gathering capabilities allegedly aiding Houthi targeting could exploit routine vessel broadcasts.

A Fragile Ceasefire Under Strain

The renewed fighting threatens the broader ceasefire that has largely held since March 2022, along with Oman-brokered peace talks that have stalled without much progress — a stalemate the report suggests is a key driver behind the Houthis’ return to hostilities. Traffic through the Bab el Mandeb reportedly continues, though possibly at reduced volume, with Saudi-bound vessels apparently more cautious than those transiting to and from the Suez Canal.

Reviewed by Ibrahim Halil Ceylan, Marine Surveyor at Apeks Marine.